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Ghosting
The Courts’ Views on Ghostwriting Ethics are
wildly divergent. it’s time to find uniformity
and Enhance Access to Justice

by Jona Goldschmidt

S

ince the mid-1990s, advocates for increased access to justice have
touted unbundled (or limited-scope, or discrete-task) legal services
as a means of distributing legal services to those unable to afford
full legal representation.1 In response, a growing number of states
are adopting court rules permitting lawyers to make limited appearances for particular stages of the litigation, without requiring a motion for
leave to withdraw from the case after the service is rendered.2 Another form —
possibly the most common — of discrete-task representation is ghostwriting.
Attorney Forrest Mosten, the “father” of unbundling, includes in his examples
of the practice: “Lawyers can ghostwrite letters or court pleadings for the client
to transmit or review and comment on documents the client has prepared, or
be engaged only to send a letter on behalf of the client on law-firm letterhead.”3
Surely, ghostwriting existed well before Mosten included it in his examples of unbundled legal services. There is no way of knowing how many, and
for how long, lawyers and nonlawyers have engaged in ghostwriting pleadings to assist pro se litigants — indigent or nonindigent. It is reasonable to
assume that many lawyers and others have acted as ghostwriters in order to
facilitate greater access to the court, rather than for personal gain, because fees
for such services — if any are even charged — are much lower than for full
representation. Despite the laudable motives of ghostwriters, ghostwriting
has historically been considered an illegitimate form of unbundling because of
the spate of federal court opinions opposing the practice on ethical and Rule
11-violation grounds.4
This article addresses the current anomalous situation in which federal courts,
on the one hand, and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and a growing number of state high courts and ethics committees, on the other hand, diverge in their opinions regarding the propriety of
ghostwriting. I present the results of a study of 179 federal and state court 4
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opinions on the subject. After analyzing
the opinions, I conclude with a recommendation to harmonize the federal and
state courts’ views on the subject by way
of a uniform act or rule that addresses
the concerns of those courts that have
found ghostwriting to be harmless and
furthering access to courts, and those
viewing it as unethical, a violation of
Rule 11, or a practice that gives pro se
litigants an undue advantage over their
represented adversaries.
FEDERAL COURTS’ OBJECTIONS
TO GHOSTWRITING

The first of three seminal court opinions on ghostwriting, often cited by
federal courts, did not raise ethics or a
rule violation as the basis of its opposition to ghostwriting.5 The case involved
a “habitual litigant” who had filed over
30 lawsuits in five or six years, with the
help of a ghostwriter:
[W]e see no good or sufficient
reason for depriving the opposition
and the Court of the identity of the
legal representatives involved so
that we can proceed properly with
the relative assistance that comes
from dealing in the open. . . . [W] e
should not be asked to add the extra
strain to our labors in order to make
certain that the pro se party is fully
protected in his rights. . . . [T]his
unrevealed support in the background enables an attorney to launch
an attack against another member
of the Bar . . . without showing his
face. This smacks of the gross unfairness that characterizes hit-and-run
tactics.6
A second opinion issued a year later
involving the same pro se plaintiff held
that ghostwriting was, in some unstated
manner, “grossly unfair to both this
court and the opposing lawyers and
should not be countenanced.”7 A third

					

early, oft-cited opinion from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
involving a prisoner seeking a free trial
transcript rested its condemnation of
ghostwriting on Rule 11: “What we fear
is that in some cases actual members of
the bar represent petitioners, informally
or otherwise, and prepare briefs for
them which the assisting lawyers do not
sign,” and which the court considered a
violation of Rule 11.8
The aforementioned rulings form the
basis of most subsequent federal decisions finding ghostwriting unacceptable
on ethical and Rule 11 grounds. Later
opinions raised an additional “undue
advantage” argument:
[The plaintiff’s] pleadings seemingly
filed pro se but drafted by an attorney
would give him the unwarranted
advantage of having a liberal pleading standard applied whilst holding
the plaintiffs to a more demanding
scrutiny. Moreover, such undisclosed
participation by a lawyer that
permits a litigant falsely to appear as
being without professional assistance
would permeate the proceedings.
The pro se litigant would be granted
greater latitude as a matter of judicial discretion in hearings and trials.
The entire process would be skewed
to the distinct disadvantage of the
nonoffending party.9
The language in the former
ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility (MRPR) Rule 1.2(c)
specifically permits lawyers to “limit
the scope of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives
informed consent.” But federal courts
have handed down numerous decisions
holding that the ghostwriting lawyer
breaches a number of ethical duties
contained in the current ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
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(or its earlier iterations) or state rules
of professional responsibility. These
include arguments that a lawyer ghostwriter breaches the duty of candor to
the tribunal by making false statements
to the court.10 Some courts go beyond
the violation of the candor requirement,
holding that to ghostwrite pleadings
is an act of fraud, misrepresentation,
or deceit. They cite sections of MRPC
Rule 8.4, which states that “[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so,
or do so through the acts of another; . . .
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
[or] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”11
Rule 11 Objections. In my 2002 article entitled In Defense of Ghostwriting,12
I argued that none of the federal court’s
legal bases for opposing ghostwriting had any merit. On the Rule 11
argument, I first noted that no court
rules explicitly prohibit ghostwriting. Neither Rule 11’s language nor its
spirit justifies a blanket prohibition on
ghostwriting for a pro se litigant absent
reasonable grounds to believe that the
practice involved intentional deception
or an effort to avoid the rules.13 Also,
the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes
specifically provide that Rule 11 applies
not only to signatories of pleadings, but
to anyone responsible for a violation
of the Rule.14 Thus, absent reasonable
grounds to believe the Rule has been
violated, I argued there is no justification for invoking Rule 11 as a pretext
for barring ghostwriting or compelling
disclosure of the ghostwriter’s identity.
Undue Advantage Objection. As
to the undue advantage argument, I
explained that the liberality rule for
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review of pro se pleadings15 was no
different from the rule (at the time) that
no complaint may be dismissed unless
“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.”16 And, since all complaints
must be “construed generously,”17
pleadings — filed pro se or otherwise
— are entitled to liberal construction.
(The Supeme Court “Twiqbal” opinions
altered the general pleading standards,
requiring complaints to allege plausible
claims.) Moreover, Rule 11 applies to all
papers filed in an action, not only the
initial complaint. But most concerns
raised about ghostwriting deal with the
initial complaint. And any shortcomings of a complaint may be amended, so
the difference between the pro se liberality rule and the general rule of liberality
is “a distinction without a difference.
In either case the plaintiff will seek to
correct the deficiencies . . . . As such,
where is the undue advantage or unfairness to the represented party?”18 As I
wrote in my 2002 article:
Practically speaking, . . . ghostwriting is obvious from the face of
the legal papers filed, a fact that
prompts objections to ghostwriting in the first place. . . . Thus,
where the court sees the higher
quality of the pleadings, there is
no reason to apply any liberality in
construction because liberality is,
by definition, only necessary where
pleadings are obscure. If the pleading can be clearly understood, but
an essential fact or element is missing, neither an attorney-drafted nor
a pro se-drafted complaint should
survive the [dispositive] motions.
A court that refuses to dismiss or
enter summary judgment against a
non-ghostwritten pro se pleading
that lacks essential facts or elements
commits reversible error in the same

39

Permitting
ghostwriting
so that claims
and defenses are
adequately crafted
levels the playing
field and streamlines
the litigation process.
manner as if it refuses to deny such
dispositive motions against an attorney-drafted complaint.19
Permitting ghostwriting so that
claims and defenses are adequately
crafted levels the playing field and
streamlines the litigation process by
clarifying the issues and reducing the
number of dispositive motions and
responses.20
Ethics Objections. Aside from the
general principle that lawyers may
provide limited representation,21 the
MRPC does not explicitly address
the ghostwriting issue. In Informal
Ethics Opinion 1414 (1978), the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility considered
a case of a lawyer who drafted a pro se
litigant’s pleadings and memoranda, sat
in on his client’s trial, and provided him
advice, all without entering a formal
appearance.22 The committee found that
a lawyer who gives advice to or drafts

a pleading for a client does not violate
any of the Canons of Ethics under the
former ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. If, however, a lawyer
provides additional legal services, the
propriety of his conduct will depend
upon the facts and the extent of the
lawyer’s participation on behalf of a litigant who appears to the court and other
counsel as not having representation.
In other words, if a lawyer engages in
“extensive and undisclosed participation
. . . that permits the litigant to falsely
appear as lacking professional assistance,” then the lawyer violates the duty
of candor to the tribunal.23
Soon after Opinion 1414 was issued,
the positions of state courts and ethics
bodies fell into three categories: (1)
those requiring disclosure of the fact that
“extensive” or “substantial” assistance
beyond drafting of pleadings was being
received (the ABA approach); (2) those
finding that the act of ghostwriting a
pleading and little more constitutes per
se extensive or substantial assistance 4
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and requires disclosure of the identity of
the ghostwriter (or disclosure that such
assistance was received); and (3) those
finding that attorneys entering into
limited services agreements are bound
by all professional responsibility rules,
but that no disclosure of ghostwriters’
identities was required.24
In its 2007 Formal Ethics Opinion
07-446 (Opinion 07-446), the ABA
Standing Committee reversed itself,
finding no unethical conduct on the
part of lawyers performing ghostwriting services.25 The committee decided:
“A lawyer may provide legal assistance
to litigants appearing before tribunals
‘pro se’ and help them prepare written submissions without disclosing or
ensuring the disclosure of the nature or
extent of such assistance.”26 The committee found that “the fact that a litigant
submitting papers to a tribunal on a
pro se basis has received legal assistance
behind the scenes is not material to the
merits of the litigation”;27 “permitting
a litigant to file papers that have been
prepared with the assistance of counsel without disclosing the nature and
extent of such assistance will not secure
unwarranted ‘special treatment’ for that
litigant or otherwise unfairly prejudice
other parties to the proceeding. . . . [I] f
the undisclosed lawyer has provided
effective assistance, the fact that a
lawyer was involved will be evident to
the tribunal. If the assistance has been
ineffective, the pro se litigant will not
have secured an unfair advantage”;28
there is no violation of the prohibition
upon dishonesty under MRPC 8.4(c)
because “[t]he lawyer is making no
statement at all to the forum regarding
the nature or scope of the representation, and indeed, may be obliged under
Rules 1.210 and 1.611 not to reveal
the fact of the representation. Absent
an affirmative statement by the client,
which can be attributed to the lawyer,

					

that the documents were prepared without legal assistance, the lawyer has not
been dishonest within the meaning of
Rule 8.4(c)”;29 and, for the same reason,
“we reject the contention that a lawyer
who does not appear in the action
circumvents court rules requiring the
assumption of responsibility for their
pleadings. Such rules apply only if a
lawyer signs the pleading and thereby
makes an affirmative statement to the
tribunal concerning the matter. Where
a pro se litigant is assisted, no such duty
is assumed.”30
A growing number of states’ legal
ethics committees now agree with the
ABA position. They reversed their
previous opposition to the practice
based on the 1978 Opinion 1414, and
now hold that ghostwriting is permissible, with some variation in ghostwriter
identity disclosure requirements. But
the overwhelming number of federal
courts that have expressed an opinion
on the subject, with one exception,31
persist in their view that limited representation and ghostwriting violate
various state ethics rules (as there are no
federal ethics rules for lawyers), even in
a state where local rules permit ghostwriting. Colorado, for example, is a state
that permits limited representation and
disclosed ghostwriting, but federal courts
there prohibit these practices.32
One critique of Opinion 07-446 (in
an ABA publication, no less), stating
that the decision is “seriously flawed,”
essentially rehashes all the arguments
specifically rejected by the ethics
committee.33 This critique relies exclusively on the federal anti-ghostwriting
case law. It raises the candor-to-thetribunal issue, disregarding the fact
this ethical duty expressly applies only
to “advocates” before the court.34 The
authors raise potential Rule 11 concerns,
disregarding the fact that courts have
the power to hail into court persons or
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firms that promote the litigation but
do not sign their name to pleadings.35
They argue that ghostwriting could be
material to litigation because “a lawyer
may craft claims or spot defenses that
the pro se litigant would not, or [would
not] be able to, [and] craft arguments to
defeat summary judgment that a pro se
litigant would never be able to make”36
— as if that were so bad. Lastly, they
argue that ghostwriting has the potential to give ghostwriting lawyers “a
free pass to defame or insult courts,”37
in violation of the ethical prohibition
against challenging the integrity of the
judiciary, surely a speculative stretch,
and not sufficient to delegitimize ghostwriting generally.
Another commentator said that the
opinion contained “circular reasoning,”
and that it “appears to be an attempt
to ease the burden on judges and to
encourage attorneys to help pro se litigants.”38 One wonders why that would
be an improper motivation underlying
the opinion. Also skeptical of the practice are the authors of the ABA/BNA
Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct,
who continue to caution that “[l]awyers
who help a pro se litigant by ‘ghostwriting’ a pleading or other court document
without revealing their role in creating
the document are arguably circumventing their Rule 11 obligation to certify
that the pleadings have merit.”39 And
insurance defense lawyers are now
getting advice regarding “practical
strategies that you can employ against
pro se litigants assisted by ghostwriting
attorneys to achieve the best possible
results for your client.”40
Others, however, welcome Opinion
07-446. One attorney, commenting on
the undue advantage argument rejected
by the committee, stated: “Treating
pleadings more leniently does not make
it more likely that a pro se litigant will
win. . . . It simply makes it more likely
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that the pro se litigant’s case will be
heard on the merits.”41 Even in the habeas
corpus petition-drafting context, the new
rule also has positive implications:
[F]or those who do wish to practice
without making an appearance for
even a portion of a case, the ethical
freedom to decline to disclose any
amount of ghosting is attractive.
This is particularly true because
the ghost lawyer has no guarantee
that the client will follow the game
plan as created and designed by the
lawyer. . . . This approach affords
more options to clients who either
cannot afford a lawyer in an ancillary
criminal proceeding or do not want
to turn their case over completely to
a lawyer.42
Opinion 07-446 did not authorize
ghostwriting as such, since limited
representation is expressly permitted
under MRPC 1.2(c). The critical issue is
disclosure of the ghostwriter’s identity.
We will now examine the variation in
state rules governing this issue.
STATE RULES GOVERNING
GHOSTWRITER DISCLOSURE

Despite criticisms leveled at Opinion
07-446, by 2010, at least a dozen states
had modified their procedural rules or
ethics decisions to align with the ABA’s
position.43 As commentators have noted,
“The trend in the cases is in favor of
allowing ghost written legal papers.”44
Table 1 (at right) presents an overview
of the four major types of current state
rules (including both civil pleading/
signature rules and ethics committee
opinions) governing disclosure of a
ghostwriter’s identity.
Table 1 includes the ABA’s present position and that of D.C., but no
category notation appears for the ten
states that have no rule on any aspect of
ghostwriting. The table shows 18 states 4

41

TABLE 1. FORMS OF STATE GHOSTWRITER IDENTITY DISCLOSURE RULES
State

ABA
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NY*
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Total

Disclosure of ghostwriter’s ID not required

Disclosure of
ghostwriter’s ID
required

Disclosure of
Disclosure of
ghostwriter’s ID required ghostwriting assistance
if assistance is “substanrequired, but not
tial” or “extensive”
ghostwriter’s ID

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
no rule
no rule
no rule

X
no rule
X
X
X
no rule
X
X
X
X
no rule
X
X
X
X
X
X
X (county)
X
X

X
X (city bar)

X (state)

no rule
no rule
X
X
X
X
no rule
X
no rule
X
X
X

19

X
X
X
9

7

8

Note: “No rule” means no state decision, court rule, or lawyer ethics opinion
was found regarding disclosure of author of ghostwritten pleadings.
* This row, read from left to right, reflects the different positions of New
York’s county, state, and city bar associations, respectively.
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(including D.C.) that explicitly permit ing practices (or limited representation, may be attributable to the strength of
nondisclosure of the ghostwriter’s iden- generally), even when state law allows sentiment against pro se ghostwrittity. Nine states, however, require full these practices.45
ing, for judges who accept the practice
disclosure. The states in between those
may have no reason to issue opinions in
extremes appear in the last two columns IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT
support.”46 This lack of uniformity of
justice has implications not only for the
and are almost equally divided. Seven OF ACCESS TO COURTS
states require disclosure when the extent At present, federal and many state courts right of access to courts, but the right
of the ghostwriting — or, for that matter, and ethics committees have diametri- to a fair process and equal justice after
any form of limited-scope representa- cally opposed views of the propriety of accessing the court.
This disuniformity constitutes both
tion — is “substantial” or “extensive” ghostwriting. Moreover, it is not unrea(following the superseded 1978 ABA sonable to assume that between and a real barrier to justice and unequal
Informal Ethics Opinion 1414). Nine within the federal and state judiciary justice. In fact, a strong argument can
other states require the fact of assistance there is also a divergence of opinion be made that these differences between
be disclosed but not the identity of the between judges who do not permit the federal and state courts within a
ghostwriter; such a disclosure might ghostwriting and judges who over- given state constitute a denial of equal
read, for example, “Prepared by a lawyer look ghostwriting (or deny sanctions protection. One can envision two pro
motions) because there is no author- se plaintiffs with a similar case, say, a
licensed in State X.”
The question of ghostwriter iden- itative court decision on the matter, personal injury matter. One files his
tity and other ethical issues relating because those authorities that do exist complaint in federal court (invoking
to ghostwriting continue to be hotly are in conflict, or because no specific diversity jurisdiction because the defendebated in bench and bar meetings and harm is shown. The authors of a recent dant is from out of state), and the other
in continuing legal and judicial educa- book on the subject of ghostwriting in files in state court. The federal plaintiff
tion programs. Lawyers in states that various professions and contexts accu- would be prohibited from ghostwriting
have a single rule on the subject are rately note: “The weight of case law on assistance, while the state court plainlucky to have some guidance. Those this [anti-ghostwriting] side of the issue tiff would be able to benefit from it.
in the ten states with no
state law or ethical guidTABLE 2. FEDERAL AND STATE GHOSTWRITING CASES BY YEAR (N = 179)
ance whatsoever only have
a multitude of anti-ghostwriting federal opinions 25
to go by. Lawyers in other
jurisdictions, like New
York and West Virginia, 20
have multiple rules on
the subject from different
ethics bodies. So, confusion 15
reigns from the lawyers’
perspective, which naturally has a chilling effect 10
on their willingness to
ghostwrite. Many indi5
vidual judges, in addition
to lacking guidance, have
their own predilections
0
about ghostwriting ethics.
Some federal courts have
raised state ethics rule
Note: The percentages on this and all other tables have been rounded. Missing years are years in which no ghostwriting opinions were published.
violations over ghostwrit-
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Which claimant would go further in
the litigation and thereby secure access
to justice? It goes without saying that
the pro se plaintiff in state court would
fare much better. Ghostwriting may
not, of course, ensure victory, which is
based on the facts and the law of the
individual case, but it gives the pro se
plaintiff a fighting chance at justice.
The federal court plaintiff would probably not get past the dispositive motions
stage without a ghostwriter’s assistance.
He or she would therefore have a potential due process (which includes equal
protection)47 claim against the federal
court. Moreover, upon a possible appeal,
the record in the federal plaintiff’s
case would be far less complete than
that in an appeal to the state appellate
court. The state court appeal would be
based on a fuller record, include more
issues, and might be more detailed
and comprehensible. The issues in the
federal court appeal might not even be
reached due to the ghostwriting prohibition; thus, similarly-situated pro se
plaintiffs’ cases would potentially have
different results.
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ANALYSIS OF GHOSTWRITING
OPINIONS

There is no way of knowing the extent
of undisclosed ghostwriting, but we do
have 179 federal and state court reported
and unreported opinions to date on
the subject for analysis.48 In a previous
study, I noted that no specific harm or
prejudice from ghostwriting, other than
a generalized allegation of undue advantage, was found in the 96 cases studied
there.49 The research reported here was
conducted to further our understanding
of ghostwriting, generally, and ghostwriter identity-disclosure requirements,
in particular. The disclosure requirements are unquestionably one of the
most pressing issues surrounding this
activity. This study examined the case
law in order to answer the following
questions:
1. How frequently have courts
addressed ghostwriting in
published opinions?
2. What courts have issued ghostwriting opinions?
3. What are these courts’ views of
ghostwriting?

TABLE 3. COURTS ISSUING GHOSTWRITING OPINIONS

120

In Table 3, we see that it is the U.S.
District Courts that have issued the
overwhelming number of opinions on
the subject (67 percent). Following
the district courts are bankruptcy (12
percent) and circuit courts of appeal (8
percent). The fewest opinions have been
issued by state supreme, appellate, and
trial courts (collectively, 12 percent). 4

(53%)

80
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60
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40
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0

COURTS ISSUING
GHOSTWRITING OPINIONS

90

(67%)

100

20

The frequency of ghostwriting opinions has increased since the late 1990s,
as has the frequency of pro se litigation. It is likely that the increase in
pro se representation has contributed
to the frequency of ghostwriting cases
although the prevalence of ghostwriting
itself can’t be measured accurately.

TABLE 4. COURTS’ VIEWS REGARDING GHOSTWRITING
100

140

4. Who complains about
ghostwriting?
5. Who are the recipients of
ghostwriting?
6. Who are the ghostwriters?
7. What is being ghostwritten?
8. To what extent have courts entered
sanctions against ghostwriters?

(12%)

U.S. Dist. Ct. Bankruptcy
Ct.

(8%)
U.S. Cir.
Ct. App.

20
(7%)
State Sup.
Ct.

(3%)
State App.
Ct.

(2%)
State Trial Ct.

(8%)

10
0

(2%)
Opposed

(1%)

(1%)

No opinion Reservations Disclosed
Required Ghostwriting
about
ghostwriting for initial
held not
ghostwriting permitted pleadings misconduct
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COURTS’ VIEWS REGARDING
GHOSTWRITING

The largest number of court opinions
evidence a judicial opposition to ghostwriting (53 percent) as shown in Table
4. A sizeable proportion (36 percent),
however, discuss the subject because it is
raised by one of the parties (or the court),
but do not express an opinion on it. For
example, the court may note that the
complaint about a ghostwritten pleading is not substantiated, and, even if it
were, it is irrelevant to the case50 or “at
best tangentially related to the substance
of [the] litigation,”51 or the court may
discuss ghostwriting in the context of a
question about attorneys’ fees.52
A smaller proportion of courts (8
percent) indicate that they have reservations about ghostwriting. The lowest
proportion of cases (4 percent) reflect
a judicial opinion that ghostwriting is
permitted if disclosed, expressly permit
ghostwriting for initial pleadings so
long as it is disclosed, or have held
that ghostwriting does not constitute
misconduct.

					

		

TABLE 5. SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT GHOSTWRITING
Court

(44%)
(30%)

Opposing counsel
Revealed in
pro se litigant papers

(11%)

Appellant

(6%)

Attorney disciplinary
commission

(3%)

Co-debtor in bankruptcy

(3%)

Ins. defense counsel representing
pro se litigant on certain counts

(2%)

Pro se litigant (<1%)
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

TABLE 6. GHOSTWRITING RECIPIENTS
(1%)

Attorney (not pro se)

(2%)

Co-debtor in bankruptcy
Bankruptcy corporate creditor

(3%)
(19%)

Defendant

(75%)

Plaintiff/petitioner

SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT
GHOSTWRITING

Table 5 shows that courts (44 percent)
and opposing counsel (30 percent) are
the primary sources of complaints about
ghostwriting. Pro se litigants sometimes expressly reveal ghostwriting
in their own pleadings (11 percent).
Less often the source of the ghostwriting complaint is an adverse party to
an appeal (6 percent), a co-debtor in
bankruptcy (3 percent), an attorney
disciplinary commission (3 percent),
insurance defense counsel (2 percent),
or, on rare occasion, a pro se adversary
of the pro se litigant receiving ghostwriting assistance (one case).
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TABLE 7. WHO ARE THE GHOSTWRITERS?
Licensed attorney

(67%)
(12%)

Unlicensed/suspended attorney
None (ghostwriting denied)

(6%)

Lay person

(5%)

Unidentified

(5%)
(4%)

Jailhouse lawyer
Paralegal

(1%)

Offshore Company

(1%)
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

90
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TABLE 8. WHAT IS BEING GHOSTWRITTEN?

pro se litigant denies the ghostwriting
accusation and insists the writings are his
or her own (6 percent).

Non-litigation document (1%)
Discovery (1%)
Multiple documents

WHAT IS BEING GHOSTWRITTEN?
(3%)
(4%)

Unspecified
Habeas petition

(5%)

Appellate brief

(5%)
(10%)

Bankruptcy/adversary

(13%)

Other pleadings

(27%)

Complaint/amendment
Motion/response

(30%)
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

TABLE 9. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS FOR GHOSTWRITING
Refusal to consider or
striking motion (1%)
Refusal to grant
pro hac vice motion

(3%)

Liberality refused

(3%)

Sanctions or threatened sanctions
v. ghostwriting recipient

IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(7%)

Sanctions or threatened
sanctions v. ghostwriter

(32%)
(54%)

No sanctions

0

20

Not unexpectedly, Table 8 shows that
ghostwriting primarily takes the form
of drafting, or responding to, dispositive motions (30 percent) and drafting
of complaints or amended complaints
(27 percent). Ghostwriters also assist in
drafting other pleadings (13 percent).
Bankruptcy assistance, by way of
preparation of schedules of assets and
liabilities and assistance with adversary
proceedings, is also a common form of
ghostwriting (10 percent). Fewer examples of ghostwriting appear in cases
involving appellate briefs (5 percent),
habeas petitions (5 percent), and a variety
of other litigation and discovery documents (collectively 5 percent). In some
cases, the nature of the ghostwritten item
is unspecified (4 percent), being generically referred to as legal papers.

40

60

80

100

120

GHOSTWRITING RECIPIENTS

WHO ARE THE GHOSTWRITERS?

Table 6 shows that the bulk of beneficiaries of ghostwriting are plaintiffs
or petitioners (75 percent). Pro se litigants are not, however, always plaintiffs
or petitioners. Pro se defendants are in
fact the second largest group of ghostwriting recipients (19 percent). Less
often, ghostwriting recipients are bankruptcy corporate creditor (not pro se) or
co-debtors (5 percent).

Table 7 shows that licensed attorneys
comprise the largest group (67 percent)
of ghostwriters.53 Only 12 percent of
the ghostwriters turn out to be unlicensed (i.e., disbarred or out-of-state) or
suspended attorneys. Occasionally, the
court fails to identify the ghostwriter (5
percent), or the ghostwriter is a nonlawyer, a jailhouse lawyer, a paralegal, or
even an “offshore company” providing
ghostwriting services (collectively 11
percent). There are some cases where the

Table 9 shows that a bare majority (54
percent) of judges do not sanction the
ghostwriter or the ghostwriting beneficiary. A fair number (32 percent),
however, do either sanction or threaten
sanctions such as reprimands, reference
to state ethical bodies, and fines against
the ghostwriter. To a far lesser extent,
courts sanction or threaten sanctions
against the ghostwriting recipient (7
percent). In the fewest number of cases,
courts have treated the ghostwriting
recipient’s pleading without the liberality to which pro se litigants are entitled
(3 percent), or have refused to grant the
ghostwriter’s motion to appear pro hac
vice (3 percent). In only one case did
the court refused to consider or grant a
motion (1 percent).
4
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NEED FOR REFORM

Relevant to the ghostwriting controversy are lawyers’ ethical obligations
described in the MRPC Preamble: “A
lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice.”54 As a public citizen,
a lawyer “should seek improvement of
the law and access to the legal system, the
administration of justice and the quality
of service rendered by the legal profession.”55 “All lawyers should devote
professional time and resources and use
civic influence to ensure equal access to our
system of justice for all those who because
of economic or social barriers cannot afford
or secure adequate legal counsel.”56 And
lawyers also have an ethical duty to
“provide legal services to those unable
to pay.”57 These points all support the
current ABA rule and justify ghostwriting as a means of improving pro se
litigants’ access to courts.
The conflicting federal and state
positions, however, point to the need
for clarification and uniformity regarding ghostwriting and the disclosure of
the ghostwriter’s identity. It is time
for the federal and state judiciaries and
the legal profession to adopt uniform
rules governing ghostwriting. Uniform
rules will help eliminate conflicting
rules among federal courts, state ethics
committees (or between the same state’s
ethics committees), and individual
judges, and such rules can enhance access
to justice. One approach would be to
request the Uniform Law Commission
to develop a proposed uniform statute
or rule on the subject. In order for that
body to accept an issue for harmonization, “[t]he subject of the act must
be such that uniformity of law among
states will produce significant benefits
to the public through improvements
in the law,”58 which certainly applies in

					

the ghostwriting context. Or, perhaps a
joint state-federal task force composed
of members of state and federal judiciaries, such as representatives from the
Conference of Chief Justices and the
Judicial Conference of the U.S. Courts,
as well as bar representatives could be
empaneled to address the ghostwriting
issue.
However a uniform rule is proposed,
it should, in my view, contain the
following elements:
1. The rule should recognize the pro
se litigant’s general right of confidentiality regarding the fact and
identity of legal counsel, subject
to disclosure for cause (e.g., filing
a scurrilous pleading) or when
an attorney personally appears to
advocate on behalf of the client.
2. The rule should establish a
preponderance standard on any
party complaining of a pro se
litigant’s undue advantage from
ghostwriting, requiring a showing of specific harm from the
practice. Such finding should be
a condition for the entry of any
order relating to the identity of
the ghostwriter, the services he or
she provides, termination of preferences in treatment the pro se
litigant would otherwise receive,
or any other relevant issue.
3. The rule should contain an
explicit provision stating that
a pro se litigant who receives
limited legal (ghostwriting) assistance is still entitled to be treated
as a pro se litigant for all purposes
not in the control of his attorney
under a limited representation.59
The ghostwriting controversy must
be resolved — and sooner rather than
later. A discussion about uniformity is
necessary to develop a consensus on the
potential benefits and harms, if any, of
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the practice, to identify best practices
for its management, and to provide clear
guidance for lawyers willing to provide
ghostwriting services.60 I agree with
the admonition that, “[i]f legal ghostwriting ceased to exist, indigent clients
might find themselves completely without legal assistance, which would surely
have a negative impact on them and
their families.”61 The time has come
for federal courts and states to resolve
the impasse, to harmonize conflicting
ghostwriting rules, and to legitimize
ghostwriting as a way to expand pro se
litigants’ access to justice.
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